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Blockchain inherits tensions that depend on its 
infrastructure design as well as distinctive features of, 
among others, smart contracts and storage mechanisms. 
Studies propose coping strategies for companies that 
deal with blockchain-related tensions, but so far 
suggestions are characterized by context- and case-
specificity. This paper proposes a meta-view on tensions 
arising from the implementation and usage of 
blockchain in organizational contexts. A structured 
literature review is conducted to condense existing 
insights from the literature to a meta-view on 
blockchain-related tension. A framework provides 
insights into different types of tensions. The framework 
has two aims: (1) providing a foundation to jointly build 
insights and IS theorization on blockchain tensions 
without being case- and context-sensitive. (2), it 
provides food for thought for companies that want to 
implement or use blockchain, which serves as first step 
toward developing recommendations that guide 
companies through identifying and managing tensions 
arising from blockchain implementation and usage. 
1. Introduction  
Every company faces the problem of how to make 
progress on seemingly conflicting objectives at the same 
time. When it comes to emerging technology usage, 
efforts to build for a tomorrow sometimes distract from 
producing results today [1]. This especially holds for 
mature firms that need to balance tensions resulting 
from exploring new developments for future 
performance, while exploiting existing information 
systems capabilities to generate sufficient value in the 
short term [2]. Blockchain technology confronts 
companies with precisely such a challenge. Allowing 
for disintermediation and the reduction of transaction 
costs (through the realization of contracts via smart 
contracts), blockchain enables significant efficiency 
gains and cost-saving potentials in the future [3,4]. Even 
beyond, the capabilities of smart contracts might enable 
far-reaching process automation and restructuring of 
sharing business models through new forms of 
collaborative information systems [5,6]. At the same 
time, the openness of the underlying peer-to-peer 
network poses some significant challenges in the now. 
Designed as an open blockchain, the question arises as 
to how the shared innovation can guarantee that all 
participants capture value [7]. If a blockchain is 
(partially) privatized, dependency relationships of 
certain participants and the question of data sovereignty 
arise [8]. Companies that want to develop or use 
blockchain must therefore be very clear about the 
potential tensions that can emerge when utilizing 
blockchain technology. 
This paper asks, what are the tensions that arise in 
the implementation and use of blockchain technology 
for businesses and how can we conceptualize them? A 
structured literature review is used for providing a meta-
view that transfers existing tensions into a more abstract 
framework, helping to abstract from case-specific 
tensions. This is an important step towards visualizing 
and discussing common blockchain tensions that 
companies need to consider when planning the 
implementation or using blockchain technology. 
By answering the research question, we provide a 
meta-view of previously identified and discussed 
tensions. This serves to synthesize existing findings and 
provides a basis for further discussion and theory 
development on blockchain’s implementation. At the 
same time, the results have practical relevance as these 
provide initial food for thought on the application of the 
technology and the potential tensions that may arise 
from it. We provoke thought by comparing and 
highlighting the relevance of blockchain-specific 
tensions compared to general tensions all companies 
face identified by Dodd and Favaro [1]. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: 
Section 2 presents related work on blockchain 
technology and interpreting tensions using a paradox 
lens. Case- and context specificity is pointed out as one 
characteristic of many tension studies that hinder 
discussing them on a more abstract level, fostering the 
development of specific theory and strategies for 
companies in implementing and using blockchain 





technology. Next, the literature review and data analysis 
are described in the third section. Section 4 is concerned 
with presenting and exemplifying the results of the 
structure literature review, depicting the tensions 
framework for blockchain technology. The results are 
discussed in section 5. Eventually, section 6 provides a 
conclusion and outlook on future work.  
2. Related Work  
This section introduces blockchain technology and 
its distinguishing features. Then, related work on 
paradox theory, which is often used to interpret and 
understand tensions in different IS contexts, is 
presented. 
2.1 Blockchain Technology 
Blockchain technology is a distributed ledger 
technology in the form of a distributed transactional 
database, secured by cryptography, and governed by 
consensus mechanisms [9]. Thereby, blockchain 
enables the secure and immutable storage of 
transactional information. Besides, the most essential 
feature of blockchain might be so-called smart 
contracts, which allow automating agreements written 
as programs on the blockchain. In general, this unlashes 
the possibility to create reliable, trust-free distributed 
record systems, that may fundamentally change the way 
how we organize processes [9,10].  
What is important, however, is that blockchain is 
characterized by a high degree of flexibility when it 
comes to the actual components of the technologies and 
thus to the properties of openness, access authorization, 
and revisability - to name just a few. Thus, scholars 
typically differentiate between different types of 
blockchain [11], i.e.: 
• Public blockchain: all nodes are allowed to read 
and propose new blockchain entries, 
• Private blockchain: only preregistered nodes, 
granted by a central authority, are allowed to read 
and propose new blockchain entries, 
• Hybrid blockchain or consortium: only nodes in 
the consortium are allowed to read blockchain 
and propose blockchain entries. 
Based on what kind of blockchain type, various 
design issues emerge that are at the core of blockchain 
tensions. For instance, public blockchains offer various 
benefits in terms of data interchange, transparency, and 
accountability, while data security and confidentiality 
might be at risk [12]. In contrast, employing a private 
blockchain may resolve data security and confidentiality 
risks, but functionalities of the original open blockchain 
(as in the first use case of bitcoin) may be lost, and thus 
efficiency gains as well as the incentive for companies 
to use this technology [13,14]. 
While companies may have different motivations 
for using blockchain technology (e.g., marketing 
purposes, experience, standardization of interfaces [8]), 
they should be aware of the underlying tensions - not 
only those arising from different types of blockchain, 
but also other design decisions. To do this, we will first 
look at the broader literature on tensions and then move 
on to examine blockchain's tensions.   
2.2. Paradox Theory and Tensions 
Information system scholars increasingly apply a 
paradox lens to understand tensions arising from 
information technology implementation and use. The 
paradox perspective, thereby, has two components: a 
contradiction between (at least) two propositions (the 
tension), and the resolution of the tension [15].  
The paradox lens has also been applied when it 
comes to blockchain implementation, e.g., in the context 
of car-related ecosystems [15] or social networks [16]. 
What these studies all have in common, however, is that 
they identify tensions and coping mechanisms for very 
specific applications of blockchain. This approach can 
also be observed in the broader management literature, 
in which studies have been pointed out to be largely 
anecdotal or single case studies that offer primarily 
contextual approaches [17].  
While these are undoubtedly important 
contributions, IS research is also in need for studies 
providing a more abstract view on tensions - detached 
from the case-specific challenges of blockchain 
implementations - which can and will help to effectively 
manage tensions arising from enable incremental 
innovation and exploring opportunities through radical 
innovation at the same time [17]. Notably, the meta-
view is expected to build common grounds to build a 
common theory on tensions in blockchain technology, 
giving scholars and organizations guidance in how to 
better identify, understand and manage potentially 
emerging tensions from specific design decisions in the 
course of the technology’s implementation and use.  
3. Literature Review and Tensions 
To obtain a meta-view of the tensions associated 
with blockchain, we conducted a structured literature 
review [20]. Using the search term: (blockchain* OR 
"distributed ledger") AND (tension* OR problem* OR 
traction* OR pressure* OR challenge*) we searched for 
peer-reviewed papers that intentionally address tensions 
and related concepts pertaining to blockchain 
implementation or use in an organizational context. The 
search was conducted in the databases of the leading IS 
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journals, i.e., Basket of Eight IS Journals as well as the 
AIS eLibrary. The search resulted in a total number of 
156 articles. Aiming to also include relevant articles 
from other databases, such as the Harvard Business 
Review, we conducted a second search using the same 
search term on Google Scholar, allowing us to add 7 
further papers to our sample. 
The resulting sample of 163 papers was then 
screened for exclusion and inclusion criteria. We 
excluded abstracts only papers, research in progress 
papers, panel and workshop formats, and editorials, 
leaving us with a total of 84 papers. The remaining 
papers were read and excluded when they only referred 
to tensions as a further explanatory factor or briefly 
mentioned them without further elaboration, reducing 
the sample to 51 papers. Based on the remaining papers, 
we performed a forward and backward search, allowing 
us to identify and add 5 more papers to our final sample 
of 56 papers. The 56 papers were then analyzed using 
open, axial, and selective coding. The coding was 
performed by both authors individually. After each step 
of coding (open, axial, and selective coding) the results 
were discussed until consensus was found. For open 
coding, articles were read and any insight in the text that 
seemed relevant was highlighted. Open coding led to a 
first set of identified and labeled sets of concepts and 
insights supported by the papers [18]. Axial coding then 
engages in building categories, thereby grouping 
concepts into main categories and, potential, sub-
categories. Axial coding led to the main themes of the 
analyzed studies’ [18]. Eventually, selective coding was 
used to integrate and refine the categories that were 
identified [18,19].  
All three coding stages were performed at least 
once for each paper, until theoretical saturation was 
reached, i.e., no new categories and themes were to be 
identified from the articles [20]. A logbook was used to 
document relevant decisions and information that 
influenced the coding procedure to ensure transparency 
and comprehensibility of the coding process [18]. 
4. Findings   
In the course of the literature analysis, 6 selective 
codes and 12 axial codes were identified representing 
the main tensions and categorization of these as 
summarized in Figure 1. In particular, throughout the 
literature review, two meta-characteristics of 
blockchain-related tensions were obvious, i.e., whether 
the tensions are controllable or manageable. 
Controllable tensions emerge from specific design 
decisions on the blockchain infrastructure that is in line 
with a companies’ overall strategic goals. In contrast, 
manageable tensions, are tensions that emerge 
independent of design choices on the infrastructure level 
that need to be considered mostly in every case of 
blockchain design. Thus, companies need to manage 
them through implementation and usage, eventually 
applying particular coping strategies. To better 
comprehend this distinction, related categories of 
controllable and manageable tensions are explained and 
exemplified in the following. Due to the meta-view, the 
descriptions abstract from concrete cases and discuss 
and interpret controllable tensions along with the two 
opposing design decisions, i.e., public vs. private 
blockchain. Controllable and manageable tensions are 
both discussed in light of the vulnerabilities they imply, 
which must ultimately be resolved through coping 
strategies. With the objective of improved clarity and 
transparency, we listed the sources representing the 
result of our literature study consequently providing the 
foundation for the development of our framework and 
discussion section in Table 1. 
Table 1. Identified literature referring to respective tension areas 
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4.1 Controllable Tensions  
Controllable tensions were identified as tensions 
concerned with corporate decisions regarding a 
companies’ environmental positioning and 
organizational alignment [11,21–23]. Environmental 
positioning refers to companies’ decision to maintain 
and participate in a public blockchain associated with 
the goal of participatory innovation and business value 
capture versus a private blockchain that implies 
focusing on competitive advantages through technology 
leadership. This tension (i.e., cooperation vs. 
competition) arises from the initial openness of 
blockchain’s infrastructure (among others, apparent 
through consensus protocols for joint verification [24]) 
that needs to be balanced and aligned with the logic of 
the organization and its demands [22,23,25]. Thus, 
implementing a private blockchain may “drifts” away 
from the original idea of its use and the organization 
may lose control of it [22,26]. Notably, private 
blockchains may lead to a loss of value that might be co-
created in consortia or a fully open blockchain 
ecosystem [3], while at the same time it allows 
companies to control who captures value (e.g., through 
the use of data generated and stored on a blockchain) in 
a distributed infrastructure [8]. While the reversed logic 
applies to original applications of blockchain, i.e., 
public blockchains, companies must weigh these 
vulnerabilities in the light of their overall organizational  
strategy and positioning.  
It is necessary to make an informed choice between 
these two propositions (or to find a compromise to cope 
with these propositions) as they have a significant 
impact on organizational alignment [27]. 
Organizational alignment is a tension that arises from 
the divide between aiming at primarily external value 
networks or internal value creation and capture (while 
these are to be understood as two not mutually exclusive 
extreme positions) [28–30]. Organizational alignment 
refers to the alignment of blockchain’s infrastructure 
with internal and/or inter-corporate business processes 
that may lead to the creation of external value networks 
[27]. While reliance on external value networks implies 
possible effects on internal operational efficiency (e.g., 
through speed loss and dependency relationships) 
[31,32], the internal value might limit the 
democratization of sensemaking on publicly available 
data that can foster distributed innovation and 
technological mashups [33]. Companies need to  
consider organizational alignment as they therefore 
either tend to focus on achieving project goals and 
satisfying customer needs through internal value versus 
the initiative to probing new ideas through value 
networks to surface novel opportunities [34]. 
Since these tensions are strongly influenced by the 
initial infrastructure design or arise during a blockchain 
application (typically, each blockchain is highly 
centralized at the beginning of its use until a critical 
mass is established), we call them controllable. We will 
now move on to tensions that are to some extent 
independent of the initial design decisions, i.e., tensions 
that companies need to manage throughout blockchain 
implementation, adaptation, and its usage. 
4.2 Manageable Tensions 
Manageable tensions are challenges that are largely 
independent of the design decisions (public, private 
consortium blockchain) of companies about the setup of 
the blockchain infrastructure. They arise from the 
(partially) distributed nature of the blockchain. 
Therefore, these tensions cannot be controlled, but they 
Figure 1. Framework of Blockchain Tensions 
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can be actively managed. In the run-up to the 
implementation and use of blockchain, companies must 
therefore not only consider the strategic orientation and 
alignment with intra- and inter-organizational 
processes, but also, among other things, weigh up the 
traceability and anonymity, the exclusivity or 
inclusivity, and the form of trust. These manageable 
tensions are explained in the following. 
The value discipline refers to tensions that relate to 
what companies want to achieve with a blockchain 
solution [35]. While this discipline seems similar to 
organizational alignment, the focus of the value 
discipline is not on alignment to intra- or inter-
organizational processes (and thus primarily on value 
capture), but on aligning value creation with the desires 
of a company's internal and external customers [36]. 
Tight coupling refers to the alignment of value creation 
with customer needs and demand fulfillment (e.g., 
greater traceability and transparency or higher returns 
by reducing unnecessary friction in customer 
processes). Loose coupling means that a company 
partially detaches itself from the customer's wishes and 
proposes something that goes beyond customer-
centricity. An example of the latter is financial service 
providers releasing free blockchain networks for peer-
to-peer lending to the unbanked to turn them into 
potential future customers [3]. While the former allows 
maximizing the existing potential of value creation, in 
loose coupling the company goes beyond risking failure 
and offering an infrastructure or service for which there 
is – at the moment - little demand. Independent of the 
infrastructure design, companies thus need to determine 
the degree of innovation and novelty in the application 
of blockchain, which is a tension with advantages and 
disadvantages that are often observed in the application 
of new technologies [37].  
The integration model refers to tensions related to 
the openness of the blockchain application to other 
participants, i.e., whether an inclusive or exclusive 
approach is pursued. While both characteristics are 
possible in different configurations (competitive or 
cooperative), competitive models tend towards 
exclusivity, while cooperative approaches mainly 
promote inclusivity [21,38]. Exclusivity implies that 
participation and involvement in a blockchain are 
regulated. This might happen, among others, with 
access or validation rights that are granted through the 
consensus protocol, smart contracts as well as general 
entry barriers for individuals or companies that want to 
participate in the peer-to-peer network) [39,40]. 
Exclusivity thereby might range from strong exclusivity 
(e.g., intra-company blockchain applications) to mixed 
forms, such as company networks (i.e., consortia). The 
integration model yields the tension whether a company 
has a profit emphasis (i.e., focus on exclusivity) or a 
breakthrough emphasis (i.e., focus on inclusivity). In the 
latter case, the likelihood of innovative process and 
business model changes is more likely [32]. Hence, 
while the question of access and readability of 
blockchain entries is often discussed in the literature as 
a purely governance-related or security issue [40], it 
may also have implications for management trade-offs 
between growth and profitability [1,32,36]. 
Trust in blockchain is a frequently addressed topic 
that extends along with the tensions of trust in 
institutions or the participants of a blockchain solution 
and trust in the blockchain code [41,42]. As in the other 
cases, compromises and mixed forms are possible; the 
propositions mentioned reflect the extreme forms 
[15,43,44]. Companies need to be aware of the tensions 
between these forms of trust and understand the 
consequences of paths between the different trust 
models [45]. For example, trust within an organization 
can significantly change the corporate culture. While 
trust in participants can, in the worst case, lead to a 
divergent cultural identity (e.g., divisions that use a 
blockchain solution and those that do not) and a culture 
of blaming or finger-pointing. In contrast, trust in code 
creates a sort of neutrality [1]. Trust in codes requires 
that companies agree on universally applicable rules and 
metrics that are tied to smart contracts [46]. This can 
lead to tensions in organizations a priori to the 
implementation and use of blockchain. Therefore, 
companies need to consider this trade-off very carefully 
and define the trust model prudently to anticipate 
downstream or upstream effects [29,45,47]. 
Eventually, the accountability model was identified 
as a further area of tension in the IS literature [48,49]. 
The accountability model is strongly linked to 
compliance aspects in the organization, as the 
accountability model is responsible for whether a 
company allows strong transparency of logged records 
and responsibilities on the blockchain or anonymity 
resp. pseudo-anonymity [50,51]. From a management 
perspective, transparency allows for a democratization 
of validation and participation, which allows for the 
involvement of the entire organization and thus for 
complete decentralization. Anonymity may come at the 
cost of participation, as employees or other companies 
may not want to or be able to participate in a blockchain 
solution with an anonymous model. In particular, 
anonymous solutions make companies or company 
networks potentially more vulnerable to fraud or misuse 
of data and manipulation [11,51]. Additionally, 
companies might face several regulatory issues 
depending on their accountability model, since 
blockchain’s properties (e.g., the irreversibility of data 
on the blockchain) are conflicting with laws, such as the 
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [52]. 
However, as scholars have identified ways to comply 
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with regulations such as GDPR when offering 
blockchain-based applications [53,54], we see the major 
issue lying in the agreement of all parties participating 
in the blockchain to the accountability model and 
associated business risks. 
5. Discussion 
The presented framework identifies the different 
core areas where tensions can arise during blockchain 
implementation and use and distinguishes between 
controllable and manageable tensions. The distinction 
and the attention to these differences and core areas 
should assist companies in the future to anticipate and 
better understand tensions arising from blockchains 
usage in corporate contexts. In particular, however, this 
section of the paper aims to relate these partly technical 
issues (i.e., the design and configuration of blockchain 
features) to general tensions of a company as discussed 
by [1]. This allows us to frame blockchain-related 
tensions in the context of recurring business 
considerations and to identify their relevance and 
contribution to each of the general tensions. 
Scholars have identified three overarching tensions 
areas every company faces, i.e., (1.) profitability vs. 
growth, (2.) short term vs. long term, (3.) whole vs. parts 
[1]. These tensions must not require a unique strategy 
but represent a constant oscillation between two extreme 
propositions. In other words, tensions represent a 
pendulum to which companies are constantly exposed 
[1]. Blockchain tensions are discussed and interpreted 
along with these major tension areas in the following, 
acknowledging that the salience of tensions may change 
during the development and implementation of 
blockchain. Figure 2 summarizes the interpretation of 
blockchain tensions along with these overall corporate 
tensions and proposes guiding questions for companies 
in identifying suitable coping strategies.  
 
Tension area 1 - Profitability vs. growth: 
Companies have been observed to swing between 
growth push and productivity push, whereas in difficult 
times companies tend to give priority to reducing costs. 
In contrast, companies focus on growth in boom times 
[1], which might lead to a loss of control over costs as 
well as eroding margins. Once the focus shifts back to 
profitability, companies fall short on top-line growth, 
leading to a growth orientation again. At best, 
companies manage to balance these tensions, i.e. what 
we call organizational ambidexterity [17,37].  
If companies want to balance aspects of 
profitability and growth, they must consider the tension 
of environmental positioning and value discipline. In the 
context of environmental positioning, companies should 
particularly consider the benefits of a completely open 
blockchain and thus the possibility of participatory and 
distributed innovation vs. control over value capture, 
when deploying a private blockchain. The use of a 
(partially) private blockchain can promote the 
profitability of a company. Operators of private and 
semi-private blockchains have control over data and can 
lock their members into the solution for the long term 
through service contracts, creating not only a platform 
dependency but also a technology dependency [8]. This 
promotes the long-term profitability of the company.  
On the other hand, the use of an open or semi-open 
blockchain and, thus focusing on cooperation, 
potentially leads to distributed innovation and growth 
through the emergence of new business models and 
collaborative processes [14,55]. It is important to 
Table 2. Guiding questions to address blockchain tensions in organizations 
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understand, that most companies never resolve the 
profitability vs. growth tension – it is like a balloon 
being squeezed at one end and expanding at another. 
Yet, a successful strategy to reconcile is to focus on the 
customer benefit of a blockchain application [1], leading 
us to the discussion of the role of the value discipline to 
manage tension area 1.  
The propositions related to the value discipline of a 
blockchain application, its implementation, and use 
have a direct influence on the growth versus profitability 
tension. In particular, a possible coping strategy lies in 
the question of whether a blockchain solution should 
primarily satisfy existing demand and requirements of a 
company's (internal or external) customers or go 
beyond, e.g., by offering a completely new solution 
path. Going beyond customer-centricity thereby might 
be a valuable approach, considering that the increasing 
amount of data available about customers and, thus, also 
participants and contributors of a blockchain, might be 
reduced to data points that only serve as means to an end 
to a blockchain provider (e.g., given a private 
blockchain) [56]. Avoiding the negative effects on 
customers and various stakeholders in a private 
blockchain, but also for blockchain ecosystems, 
considering going beyond customer-centricity helps to 
not turn against the customer by utilizing the massive 
amount of data available for customization [56]. At the 
same time, novel solutions for building trust through 
e.g., data passports for identity self-management that 
might foster growth and network effects [57]. 
Eventually, the general tension of growth vs. 
profitability is influenced by the blockchain-related 
tension of environmental positioning. Design decisions 
concerning the degree of openness and decentralization, 
therefore, need to be carefully considered to avoid 
undesired path dependencies. Also, companies might 
consider situational approaches, where, depending on 
the priority between growth and profitability push, they 
can adjust participation and validation rules [58].  
Tension area 2 – Long term vs. short term: Dodd 
and Favaro [1] emphasize that companies tend to swing 
between a focus on strategy and execution. When 
focusing on strategy, typically companies were eager to 
concentrate on building for the future, leading to issues 
concerning performance today (e.g., difficulties in 
hitting earning targets) and vice versa. Likely, 
companies that want or are using blockchain will have 
to manage such tensions. These tensions are closely 
related to the controllable tension of organizational 
alignment and the manageable tensions of the 
integration model and the accountability model. 
While the tension of long versus short term is 
reflected in the discussion around growth versus 
viability, short versus long term tensions require 
decision making on management level rather than 
business model level [1]. Above all, it shows that leaders 
need to rethink the companies' targets, processes, and 
routines, the former being reflected by the blockchain-
related tension of organizational alignment. 
When it comes to organizational alignment, 
companies need to consider that in the short term, the 
implementation of private blockchains can work faster 
compared to open blockchains (since, among others, the 
logic of decision making in private blockchains is 
resembling the common business logic) [24]. Private 
blockchains, thus, can be faster integrated into 
organizational processes and routines (compared to 
fully open blockchains), thereby increasing the 
efficiency not only of a process as such but also their 
traceability and manageability, e.g., by providing full 
transparency on validation and log entries captured on a 
blockchain. On the other hand, organizations that want 
to exploit external value networks might need to 
consider finding appropriate strategic partners that 
support joint value creation, strategy, and shared 
corporate values. As Dodd and Favaro [1] pointed out, 
one ‘middle ground’ to control this tension is to focus 
on sustainable earnings, which is closely related to the 
integration and accountability model in blockchain.  
The integration model regulates which access 
certain user groups have to data and verification 
mechanisms of the blockchain. Thus, this is a part of 
value sharing. While short-term perspective focuses on 
exercising control over the data and rights of a 
blockchain - thus control over value creation - a long-
term strategy asks how values can be safeguarded when 
blockchain fosters inclusivity. Companies aiming to 
achieve sustainable earnings need to balance those two 
aspects, especially in open network environments 
characterized by shared operational efficiency [34].  
Finally, the alignment along the extreme 
propositions of the accountability model determines the 
extent to which long-term strategic planning aspects are 
preferred over current revenues and a short-term 
alignment of the organization. Here, an alignment of the 
management is required with regard on the propositions 
of complete transparency versus anonymity in the 
blockchain network. In the short term, the former should 
be used to optimize internal processes by, among other 
things, making activities traceable, while at the same 
time promoting the flow of data within the company 
through an internal, private, or partially private 
blockchain. Through this, reliance on the profitability 
and yield of processes can be achieved.  
On the other hand, the long-term orientation of the 
accountability model theoretically leads to control 
losses due to the anonymity of users and increased risks 
of data misuse and manipulation within the scope of 
cross-company processes [59]. However, since great 
risk often goes together with greater reward, it makes 
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sense to relax strict accountability rules (if a company's 
industry and organizational structure allow, e.g., taking 
into account regulatory requirements) and encourage 
growth and shift to future performance indicators 
through larger networks (pseudo)anonymity. Here, the 
participation of different user groups can lead to 
distributed and combinatorial innovation in networks 
through different affordances, i.e., action potentials 
offered by a blockchain to participants and their 
interaction via the infrastructure [3].   
Tension area 3 – Whole versus parts: Most 
companies are concerned with the tension that is 
concerned with whole versus parts, or centralization 
versus decentralization (note that for instance, public 
blockchain might be distributed, but at the beginning not 
yet decentralized until a critical mass of participants is 
reached). While typically swinging between those 
propositions, Dodd and Favaro [1] indicate that 
discussions to determine the degree of (de)centralization 
revolve around the exploitation of synergies, which can 
only be exploited by focusing on the whole, while at the 
same time, influencing and limiting the individual 
business units, thus leading to eroding profits, which, in 
turn, leads to a focus on parts of the organization, e.g., 
certain corporate departments, units, or teams [1]. 
Overall, these alignments have close relation with 
corporate culture and cultural identity. Strict cultural 
identities across business units or functions promote a 
focus on parts of the company, i.e., decentralization. 
Thus, in this tension, business decisions revolve around 
the organizational model, i.e., structures, culture, and 
people, with trust being one aspect of these aspects.  
The trust model must be carefully selected in the 
context of a blockchain project, as it is the crux of any 
blockchain, resulting in intermediation and the potential 
reduction, if not elimination, of intermediaries and 
transaction costs [60]. Thus, many of the technology's 
value propositions are realized through the trust model. 
Companies should consider whether, when using 
blockchain as a intra-corporate (niche) solution, there is 
the possibility of interpersonal or institutional trust, to 
emerge. This would make a technical solution through 
the blockchain virtually superfluous for trust-building - 
the blockchain would then be an infrastructure for 
processing data. In contrast, a focus on the entire 
company, i.e., the whole, is often accompanied by a 
more extensive solution, which might require a 
technology-based trust model, e.g., between business 
units of companies that cooperate via a blockchain.  
The common bond to deal with tensions related to 
the whole versus parts is what [1] calls diagonal assets, 
which are particularly organizational resources and 
capabilities that help the company act as both a single 
company and many different businesses at the same 
time. This consideration can be discussed in the context 
of the trust model and under consideration of the aspects 
for which corporate purposes a blockchain with 
algorithmic trust should be used. In other cases, a 
blockchain might need to be interoperable with other 
(already existing) information systems to focus on the 
parts. Finally, another aspect of the design could be the 
use of a combination of ‘trustless’ on-chain and 
trustworthy off-chain storage, which at the same time 
makes it possible to protect corporate resources in the 
sense of storage capacities [61]. 
 6. Conclusion and Outlook 
This paper presents a structured literature review 
that identifies tensions in the implementation and use of 
blockchain technology. 
Scientific contribution: Scholars have studied 
tensions in the implementation and use of blockchain to 
contribute to the successful use of the decentralized 
technology. While this literature covers many use cases 
of the technology (e.g., in blockchain in logistics or 
commerce), it is apparent that hitherto the identified 
tensions are case-specific and, therefore, neither fully 
transferable to other cases, nor generalizable due to 
context-sensitivity of the identified tensions.  
This paper contributes to the current body of 
literature by addressing this research gap. It compiles 
blockchain-related tensions and analyses these on a 
more abstract level so that researchers can 
systematically think through blockchain-related 
tensions and corresponding design decisions. This 
might assist researchers, for example, when developing 
new use cases and blockchain-based prototypes. By 
discussing and interpreting blockchain-specific tensions 
in the context of organizations’ overall tensions (e.g., 
growth vs. profitability), the framework also helps 
researchers in better anticipating the long-term, 
potentially unintended effects of blockchain 
implementation and use on various technical, 
organizational, and cultural aspects of an organization.  
Thereby, the framework is also intended to help 
companies, as it provides initial food for thought on how 
to address tensions in blockchain and thus represents a 
first step in developing recommendations for addressing 
them. We plan to refine the framework and apply it to 
companies that have developed, want to develop, or 
have failed to develop blockchain prototypes to derive 
recommendations for these cases.  
These considerations are directly related to the 
limitations of this paper. The framework and the 
questions regarding the control and management of 
tensions in the implementation and use of the 
blockchain are currently still in a theoretical-conceptual 
stage, resulting from the inductive approach of deriving 
the tensions from the existing IS literature. This 
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limitation is to be solved in the course of the further 
development of the study, in particular by (1) extending 
the literature search to databases of other research fields, 
i.e., management and computer science, and (2) by 
adding case studies and interviews with industry 
experts, to examine the validity of the framework. Only 
by addressing the current data bottleneck necessary 
progress towards the advancement of the framework and 
the questions posed in the context of the three major 
areas of tension of an organization can be made. Further, 
insights gained in the discussion are based on the 
general tensions every company faces [1]. While on the 
one hand, this shows the role and relevance of the 
tensions in these areas of consideration for companies, 
the resulting high degree of abstraction is another 
limitation that needs to be addressed in the future. 
7. References  
[1] Dodd D, Favaro K. Managing the Right Tension. 
Harv Bus Rev 2006:1–15. 
[2] Groen AJ, Wakkee IAM, Weerd-Nederhof PC. 
Managing Tensions in a High-Tech Start-Up; An 
Innovation Journey in Social System Perspective. 
Int Small Bus J 2008;26:57–81. 
[3] Ostern NK, Rosemann M, Moormann J. 
Determining the Idiosyncrasy of Blockchain: An 
Affordances Perspective. 41st Int. Conf. Inf. Syst., 
2020, p. 1–17. 
[4] Abbatemarco N, De Rossi LM, Aakanksha G, 
Salviotti G. Beyond a Blockchain Paradox: How 
Intermediaries Can Leverage a Disintermediation 
Technology. Hawaii Int. Conf. Syst. Sci. (HICSS 
2020), 2020, p. 1–10. 
[5] Tumasjan A, Beutel T. Blockchain-based 
decentralized business models in the sharing 
economy: A technology adoption perspective. Bus. 
Transform. Through Blockchain, 2019, p. 77–120. 
[6] Dumas M, Hull R, Mendling J, Weber I. Blockchain 
Technology for Collaborative Information Systems. 
Dagstuhl Reports, 2019, p. 67–129. 
[7] Schmeiss J, Hoelzle K, Tech RPG. Designing 
Governance Mechanisms in Platform Ecosystems: 
Addressing the Paradox of Openness Through 
Blockchain Technology. Calif Manage Rev 
2019;62:121–43. 
[8] Furlonger D, Uzureau C. The Five Kinds of 
Blockchain Projects. Harv Bus Rev 2019. 
[9] Beck R, Avital M, Rossi M, Thatcher JB. 
Blockchain Technology in Business and Information 
Systems Research. Bus Inf Syst Eng 2017;59:381–4. 
[10] Rossi M, Mueller-Bloch C, Thatcher JB, Beck R. 
Blockchain Research in Information Systems: 
Current Trends and an Inclusive Future Research 
Agenda. J Assoc Inf Syst 2019;20:247–65. 
[11] Beck R, Müller-Bloch C, King JL. Governance in 
the Blockchain Economy: Framework and Research 
Agenda. J Assoc Inf Syst 2018;19:1020–34. 
[12] Uchibeke UU, Schneider KA, Kassani SH, Deters 
R. Blockchain access control Ecosystem for Big 
Data security. IEEE Smart Data, 2018, p. 1373–8. 
[13] van Hoek R. Exploring blockchain implementation 
in the supply chain: Learning from pioneers and 
RFID research. Int J Oper Prod Manag 
2019;39:829–59. 
[14] Coblenz M, Hull R, Lu Q, Weber I. A Holistic 
Vision of Blockchain-Based Application Design, 
Specification, and Implementation. Dagstuhl 
Reports, 2019, p. 90–106. 
[15] Zavalokina L, Ziolkoswki R, Bauer I, Schwabe G. 
Management, Governance and Value Creation in a 
Blockchain Consortium. MIS Q Exec 2020;19:1–17. 
[16] Ciriello RF, Beck R, Thatcher JB. The Paradoxical 
Effects of Blockchain Technology. Int. Conf. Inf. 
Syst., 2018, p. 1–17. 
[17] Andriopoulos C, Lewis MW. Exploitation-
Exploration Tensions and Organizational 
Ambidexterity: Managing Paradoxes of Innovation. 
Organ Sci 2008;20:685–834. 
[18] Wolfswinkel JF, Furtmueller E, Wilderom CPM. 
Using grounded theory as a method for rigorously 
reviewing literature. Eur J Inf Syst 2013;22:45–55. 
[19] Gläser J, Laudel G. Life with and without coding: 
Two methods for early-stage data analysis in 
qualitative research aiming at causal explanations. 
Forum Qual Sozialforsch 2013;14:1–25. 
[20] Syed M, Nelson SC. Guidelines for Establishing 
Reliability When Coding Narrative Data. Emerg 
Adulthood 2015;3:375–87. 
[21] Bazarhanova A, Magnusson J, Lindman J, Chou E, 
Nilsson A. Blockchain-based electronic 
identification: cross-country comparison of six 
design choices. Eur. Conf. Inf. Syst. (ECIS 2019), 
2019, p. 1–16. 
[22] Norstrom L, Lindman J. Exploring Blockchain 
Municipal Use Cases. Proc. Am. Conf. Inf. Syst. 
(AMCIS 2020), 2020, p. 1–10. 
[23] Hoess A, Schlatt V, Rieger A, Gilbert F. The 
Blockchain Effect : From Inter-Ecosystem to Intra-
Ecosystem Competition. 29th Eur. Conf. Inf. Syst., 
2021, p. 1–16. 
[24] Viriyasitavat W, Hoonsopon D. Blockchain 
characteristics and consensus in modern business 
processes. J Ind Inf Integr 2019;13:32–9. 
[25] Berente N, Lyytinen K, Yoo Y, King JL. Routines 
as Shock Absorbers During Organizational 
Transformation: Integration, Control, and NASA’s 
Enterprise Information System. Organ Sci 
2016;27:551–72. 
[26] Ciborra C, Braa K, Cordella A, Hepsø V, Dahlbom 
B, Failla A, et al. From control to drift: The 
dynamics of corporate information infrastructures. 
Oxford University Press (on demand); 2000. 
[27] Gordon W, Catalini C. Blockchain technology for 
healthcare: facilitating the transition to patient-
driven interoperability. Comput Struct Biotechnol J 
2018;16:224–30. 
[28] Bogusz CI, Morisse M. How infrastructures anchor 
open entrepreneurship: The case of Bitcoin and 
stigma. Inf Syst J 2018;39:1176–212. 
Page 4609
[29] Renwick R, Gleasure R. Those who control the code 
control the rules: How different persepctives of 
privacy are being written into the code of blockchain 
systems. J Inf Technol 2021;36:16–38. 
[30] Schweizer A, Schlatt V, Urbach N, Fridgen G. 
Unchaining Social Businesses - Blockchain as the 
Basic Technology of a Crowdlending Platform. ICIS 
Proc., 2017. 
[31] Villareal B, Garza F, Rosas I, Garcia D. An 
Introduction to Distribution Operational Efficiency. 
Int J Ind Eng 2012;19:278–88. 
[32] Chen Y, Pereira I, Patel PC. Decentralized 
governance of digital platforms. J Manage 
2021;47:1305–37. 
[33] Iansiti M, Lakhani KR. The truth about Blockchain: 
Harv Bus Rev 2017. 
[34] Bauer I, Zavolokina L, Leisibach F, Schwabe G. 
Exploring the Blockchain Value Creation: The Case 
of the Car Ecosystem. 52nd Hawaii Int. Conf. Syst. 
Sci., 2018, p. 1–10. 
[35] Holotiuk F, Moormann J. Organizational Adoption 
of Digital Innovation. 26th Eur. Conf. Inf. Syst. 
2018, p. 1–16. 
[36] Morkunas V, Paschen J, Boon E. How blockchain 
technologies impact your business model. Bus Horiz 
2019;62:295–306. 
[37] Montealegre R, Iyengar K, Sweeney J. 
Understanding Ambidexterity: Managing 
Contradictory Tensions Between Exploration and 
Exploitation in the Evolution of Digital 
Infrastructure. J Assoc Inf Syst 2019;20:647–80. 
[38] Böhme R, Christin N, Edelman B, Moore T. 
Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance. J 
Econ Perspect 2015. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.29.2.213. 
[39] Naerland K, Müller-Bloch C, Beck R, Palmund S. 
Blockchain to Rule the Waves - Nascent Design 
Principles for Reducing Risk and Uncertainty in 
Decentralized Environments. Proc. Int. Conf. Inf. 
Syst., 2017. 
[40] Perscheid G, Ostern N, Moormann J. Determining 
Platform Governance: Framework for Classifying 
Governance Types. 41st Int. Conf. Inf. Syst., 
Hyderabad, India: 2020, p. 1–16. 
[41] Beck R, Czepluch JS, Lollike N, Malone S. 
Blockchain – the Gateway To Trust- Free 
Cryptographic Transactions. Twenty-Fourth Eur 
Conf Inf Syst 2016. 
[42] Zhao L, Fan S, Zheng E. Blockchain enabled trust: 
the case of inter-firm dataflow. Proceeding 24th 
Am. Conf. Inf. Syst., 2018, p. 1–10. 
[43] Glaser F, Hawlitschek F, Notheisen B. Blockchain 
as a Platform. Bus. Transform. Through Blockchain, 
vol. 1, Palgrave Macmillan; 2019. 
[44] Auinger A, Riedl R. Blockchain and Trust: Refuting 
Some Widely-Held Misconceptions. Int. Conf. Inf. 
Syst. (ICIS 2018), 2018, p. 1–17. 
[45] Betzwieser B, Franzbonenkamp S, Riasanow T, 
Klenegger H, Krcmar H. A Decision Model for the 
Implementation of Blockchain Solutions. 25th Am. 
Conf. Inf. Syst., 2019, p. 1–10. 
[46] Ostern NK. Do You Trust a Trust-Free Technology? 
Toward a Trust Framework Model for Blockchain 
Technology. Int. Conf. Inf. Syst., 2018, p. 1–17. 
[47] Andersen JV, Ingram Bogusz C. Patterns of Self-
Organising in the Bitcoin Online Community : Code 
Forking as Organising in Digital Infrastructure. 
Proc. 38th Int. Conf. Inf. Syst. (ICIS 2017), 2017. 
[48] Currie WL, Gozman DP, Seddon JM. Dialectic 
Tensions in the Financial Markets: A Longitudinal 
Study of Pre- and Post-Crisis Regulatory 
Technology. J Inf Technol 2019;33. 
[49] Yin HHS, Langenheldt K, Harlev M, Mukkamala 
RR, Vatrapu R. Regulating Cryptocurrencies: A 
Supervised Machine Learning Appraoch to De-
Anonymizing the Bitcoin Blockchain. J Manag Inf 
Syst 2019;36:37–73. 
[50] Reid F, Harrigan M. An analysis of anonymity in 
the bitcoin system. Secur. Priv. Soc. Networks, 
2013. 
[51] Fabian B, Ermakova T, Sander U. Anonymity in 
bitcoin - The users’ perspective. ICIS 2016 Proc., 
2016. 
[52] Scholl HJ, Pomeshchikov R, Rodriguez MPB. Early 
Regulations of Distributed Ledger 
Technology/Blockchain Providers: A Comparative 
Case Study. Proc. 53rd Hawaii Int. Conf. Syst. Sci., 
2020, p. 1760–9. 
[53] Ostern NK, Riedel J. Know-Your-Customer (KYC) 
Requirements ofr Intial Coin Offerings. Bus Inf Syst 
Eng 2020:1–17. 
[54] Rieger A, Guggenmos F, Lockl J, Fridgen G, 
Urbach N. Building a Blockchain Application that 
Complies with the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation. MIS Q Exec 2019;18:263–79. 
[55] Müller M, Ostern N, Rosemann M. Silver Bullet for 
All Trust Issues? Blockchain-Based Trust Patterns 
for Collaborative Business Processes. Bus. Process 
Manag. (BPM 2020), Seville, Spain: 2020, p. 13–8. 
[56] Riedmann-Streitz. Redefining the Customer 
Centricity Approach in the Digital Age. Int. Conf. 
Des. User Exp. Usability, 2018, p. 203–22. 
[57] Ølnes S, Ubacht J, Janssen M. Blockchain in 
government: Benefits and implications of distributed 
ledger technology for information sharing. Gov Inf 
Q 2017;34:355–64. 
[58] Wan C, Tang S, Zhang Y, Pan C, Liu Z, Long Y, et 
al. Goshawk: A Novel Efficient, Robust and 
Flexible Blockchain Protocol. Int. Conf. Inf. Secur. 
Cryptol., 2018, p. 49–69. 
[59] Cumming DJ, Johan S, Pant A. Regulation of the 
Crypto-Economy: Managing Risks, Challenges, and 
Regulatory Uncertainty. J Risk Financ Manag 
2019;12:126–40. 
[60] De Filippi P, Mannan M, Reijers W. Blockchain as a 
confidence machine: The problem of trust & 
challenges of governance. Technol Soc 2020;62:1–
14. 
[61] Al-Breiki H, Rehman MHU, Salah K, Sventinovic 
D. Trustworthy Blockchain Oracles: Review, 
Comparison, and Open Research Challenges. IEEE 
Acess 2020;8:85678–85.
Page 4610
